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In all of his major works, Conrad places his characters in ethical dilemmas 
and then stands back and says, "Look! Why did this happen? What should 
be done?" It is primarily in this deliberate arrangement of ethical problems 
and their outcome that Conrad most clearly displays his view of life. 
Jocelyn Baines remarks, "The essence of his art lies in the construction 
of a setting where a complex state of mind can be presented with the fullest 
emotional and dramatic effect."1 If this presentation were accompanied by 
analysis, one might conclude that Conrad's interest was psychological rather 
than philosophical. But there is little analysis; rather the emphasis is on the 
"construction" and the presentation. For example, in "Heart of Darkness" 
no explanation is offered for the evil that enters Kurtz other than that he 
provided a suitably hollow receptacle for it, so that we are led to consider 
the nature of evil in the universe rather than the psychology or circumstances 
peculiar to one man. 
In Victory, Conrad shows us Heyst's stubborn scepticism invaded by love, 
but then followed by murder, suicide and chaos. We are prevented by Conrad's 
deliberate arrangement of events from holding to traditional moral values: 
even those characters who are faithful and hardworking come to catastrophic 
ends. Such a manipulation of destiny implies a fixed set of attitudes on the 
part of the writer. 
It may be worthwhile at the outset to describe in general terms what I 
believe that outlook was. I shall then go on to treat of the elements that 
comprise that outlook, and in the concluding section summarise my view of 
his attitudes. 
In order broadly to relate Conrad's views to those of established modes 
of thought, we may say that he was a pessimist with a catastrophic view of 
the universe, whose philosophy of action (or more accurately, defence) partook 
of Cynicism and Stoicism. His ethical views bear some resemblance to those 
of certain Christian-dualist writers (e.g., Dostoevsky, Melville, Hawthorne), 
and his perception of the visible world, and of Man, was deeply Manichaean. 
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To Conrad, the difference between appearance and reality was tllat the 
former represents man's false view of the world as benevolent, such a view 
being born of and sustained by human weakness: sympathy, imagination, 
intellectualisation. Thus man fabricates an unreal world of appearances and 
is trapped within that world by his own illusions and pretences, whereas in 
reality there is no benevolent force operating. In the real world - the 
"destructive element," as Stein terms it in Lord Jim - the forces that exist 
are evil. The little good that exists is the goodness of simple human virtue, 
but by the exercise of such virtue man can expect no reward. Love, friendship, 
happiness, pleasure, success, are all illusions man has constructed to mask 
the ugly reality of existence. In the end there is no loving God, no ultimate 
God, no salvation, no redemption, no perfectibility, no real progress, but only 
surcease into death. Most weakening is the practice of the Christian virtues of 
love, faith, hope and charity: man lives perpetually in a state of moral isolation. 
Against the evil forces of the universe man has few weapons, and these 
are only defensive, less weapons than armour. Solidarity is one, and others 
are fidelity, hard work and honour. But the chief protection against evil is 
knowledge (gnosis), which is achieved through the successful passing of 
tests. Men can be ranked in a gnostic hierarchy by the measure of knowledge 
they display of the true nature of the universe and human illusion. Also 
operating in man's favour, for his guidance, is an ethical coding of light and 
dark elements which sometimes in Conrad seems more than merely symbolic. 
The simple and unreflective man has the best chance of survival in this 
hostile world, but his is a triumph of ignorance. For the perceptive man, who 
must always be on his guard, nature is at best indifferent (and when it is 
passive it is only resting), but more often actively malevolent. As such, nature 
is the principal instrument of evil against mankind, and part of it is the process 
of reproduction itself (perpetuated by the enervating illusion of love), which 
increases the tormenting materiality of life. 
Because every man is in reality isolated, and because human contact only 
breeds as well as feeds on illusion, man's best policy - if he is perceptive -
is to live ascetically. The perceptive onlooker's only reasonable position is to 
derive some ironic pleasure from the mere spectacle before him. 
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It will readily be seen that, in view of these attitudes, Conrad's general 
outlook as thus described was absurdly out of line with the thinking and 
beliefs of his contemporaries. Indeed, one is hard pressed to think of any 
writer with whom he bears comparison, although there is close proximity to 
(and an undoubted influence from) the views of Schopenhauer. Such views 
are particularly inimical to those schooled in the Greek Hellenistic 
philosophical, or the Judaeo-Christian religious, tradition. Nevertheless, one 
recognises that the elements of such an outlook are rooted in this very tradition, 
even though their fusion would seem to be unique to Conrad. 
That Conrad was a pessimist is not always agreed. There exists a group 
of critics who see him in romantic terms, and persist in finding in his works 
a note of romantic optimism. Even F.R. Leavis finds the end of Victory 
"unequivocally - a victory of life."2 But the majority of modern critics do 
agree on Conrad's pessimism while disagreeing on the nature and sources 
of it. Interpretations depend on a bewildering variety of theories, ranging from 
the Freudian-Jungian to the socio-political. What they do not do, however, 
is attempt to explain the nature of Conrad's pessimism. 
To label a writer a pessimist is usually to use the word in its loose, everyday 
sense: to say that he looks consistently on the dark or gloomy side of life. 
And such usage, even implying as it does a simplistic reversal of optimism, 
is normally adequate. But when we examine in detail a writer's basic 
philosophy of life some stricter definition is obviously required. 
In its philosophical definition, pessimism is primarily the belief that reality 
is essentially evil. That is the extreme position of a pessimist, and the one 
which I believe Conrad held. The less extreme philosophical doctrine is that 
the 'evils' of life outweigh the happiness it affords. That is the more popular 
sense of the word when it is used of Conrad, and in this definition what is 
meant by 'evils' is in truth unhappiness rather than evil; thus there is implied 
no view of the universe as having a 'character' at all. 
In literature, pessimism is primarily the view that the universe is intrinsically 
either evil or indifferent, and that life is consequently futile. This view is closely 
related to the primary philosophical definition given above. Related to the 
less extreme philosophical definition is the view that there is an inevitable 
preponderance of unhappiness over happiness in life. 
9 
The strict definition, in both philosophical and literary usage, is absolute, 
constant, and cosmic: the universe is seen as being at the mercy of a malignant 
- or at least uncaring - force (cf, Gloucester's speech in King Lear, IV.1.37: 
"As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods; They kill us for their sport.") 
Alternatively, it is seen as being driven by a blind,._directionless, and irrational 
will, as in the writings of Von Hartman and Schopenhauer. Of these two views, 
it might be said that Thomas Hardy held the latter view and Conrad the former. 
In Conrad's view there is an acceptance of the active power of evil: it supposes 
a malevolent direction which at its worst is far from blind. 
"Retrogressive pessimism" - the doctrine that the world is undergoing 
an inevitible process of degeneration (cf. Spengler) - while far more common 
in literature than either of the forms of absolute cosmic pessimism, should 
not concern us but for the fact that it is held to be applicable to Conrad by 
those critics who feel that he was motivated by a nostalgic yearning for the 
past. 
Closest to Conrad's view are the 'melancholy romantics,' such as 
Baudelaire and De Vigny. Hardy, on the other hand, adhered to a type of 
stoicism which emphasised the irony of human fate, and, unlike Conrad, he 
indicates a measure of benefit, pride or satisfaction in suffering. 
Melville is sometimes linked with Conrad as a cosmic pessimist, and a 
comparison of their views may help to distinguish the nature of Conrad's 
pessimism. Like Conrad, Melville, "was concerned because he was unable 
to express all he meant, or even to bare all his deepest thoughts. " 3 But his 
method of resolving this difficulty was as different from Conrad's as was the 
essential nature of his early pessimism. Conrad never hesitated over choosing 
a view of life, while in Moby Dick Melville surveys six possible conceptions 
of the nature of evil and the universe: 
1. The transcendental view uniting God, man and nature in mutual perfection 
in a benevolent universe; 
2. The Christian Dualist view that the universe is controlled by a benevolent 
God or force that permits evil in man and nature; 
3. The Manichaean view that good and evil forces are at war perpetually for 
universal control, with evil the more powerful; 
4. The view that the universe or God is essentially evil; 
5. The view that the universe is chaotic; 
6. The view that the universe is orderly but godless, and is therefore indifferent 
to man. 
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Having weighed these possibilities in Moby Dick, Melville appears to waver 
between the second and the sixth, whereas Conrad's view was essentially 
the third, which is not incompatible with any of the final three. Melville put 
his fears about the truth of the sixth possibility ~ost clearly in a letter to 
Hawthorne: "The reason the mass of men fear God, and at bottom dislike 
Him, is because they rather distrust His heart, and fancy Him all brain like a 
watch."4 Similar suspicions of a mechanistic deity appear later in the writings 
of G.B. Shaw and W.B. Yeats, as well as Conrad. The letter to Hawthorne 
was written in 1851, the year Moby Dick was published. Forty years later, 
with Billy Budd, it became clear that Melville's early pessimism had turned 
into tragic optimism. In that work Claggart, the personification of evil, triumphs 
but his death is sudden and he is forgotten; Captain Vere similarly dies and 
is forgotten, but Billy continues to be remembered. Melville seems to be 
saying that neither man nor nature can completely destroy the good, so the 
existence of good and evil can be accepted in the confidence that only the 
good is immortal. 
Conrad's conclusions are uniformly the reverse of Melville's in Billy Budd. 
Indeed, it is those characters who are most good, or most innocent, who are 
most quickly forgotten. Stevie, Freya, Lena, Captain Anthony, Mrs. Gould, 
Antonia, Captain Mitchell, Singleton, all are rewarded by being forgotten. 
They meet the fate of Mr. Baker, the "model chief mate," who returns to find 
that "no one waited for him ashore ... mother dead, father and two brothers 
drowned ... sister married and unfriendly."5 Evil wins, in this world and 
forever. As Jocelyn Baines remarks, " ... it is useless to look for consolation 
in his work. It concedes no hope; the fate of those undisdained by destiny . 
. . is tragic, and triumph inevitably brings death."6 
In comparing Conrad with Melville, one must acknowledge Melville's great 
reluctance to disbelieve in God and the truth of Christian doctrines. Conrad 
had no such difficulty. Christianity was "distasteful" to him: "I am not blind 
to its services, but the absurd oriental fable from which it starts irritates me. 
Great, improving, softening, compasionate it may be but it has lent itself with 
amazing facility to cruel distortion and is the only religion which, with its 
impossible standards, has brought an infinity of anguish to innumerable souls 
-on this earth."7 On another occasion he wrote, "It's strange how I always, 
from the age of fourteen, disliked the Christian religion, its doctrines, 
ceremonies and festivals."8 But such disbelief was not wholly negative, for 
Conrad confessed to a "deep-seated sense of fatality governing this 
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man-inhabited world."9 Evil existed as a force in the world, and Conrad 
plainly believed both in its power and in the necessity for man to oppose it 
in his own interest. His conception of man's 'religious duty' was simply the 
awareness of and opposition to evil. 
Against man in his deadly struggle is the fact of his isolation. Most of 
Conrad's characters are what Melville, in describing th crew of the 'Pequod,' 
called "isolatoes ... not acknowledging the common continent of men, but 
each isolate living on the separate continent of his own."10 Such a state is 
the antithesis of Donne's 'No man is an island.' Adam Gillon, in his study of 
isolation in Conrad's novels, says: "Thrown upon himself, the isolated man 
forever faces an impassable wall that separates him even from the people 
who stand closest to him."11 And Baines agrees that" ... there is no invariable 
element that is either the cause of misfortune or else an essential ingredient 
of the tragedy: the emotional and moral isolation of the individual."12 
However, it is possible to agree that isolation is "an essential ingredient 
of the tragedy" while vehemently disagreeing that it is ever "the cause of 
misfortune" in Conrad. As a fact of the human condition, isolation may 
contribute to misfortune, but when Baines and Gillon insist on the importance 
of the theme of isolation they fail to see the larger picture: isolation may be 
a regrettable condition, but it is one that is incapable of alteration. 
Of all Conrad's protagonists, only Axel Heyst in Victory intentionally isolates 
himself. In all other cases the characters are isolated by the nature of their 
circumstances, either physically or psychologically. Heyst's total and voluntary 
withdrawal from the world to a life of solitary asceticism is not the cause of 
his destruction. His doubt about the correctness of his action contributes to 
his unease, but it is his brief surrender of isolation that destroys him. His 
moment of weakness in sympathising with and then rescuing Lena brings as 
a direct consequence all the evils that befall him, and it is clear that had he 
continued to heed his father's advice he might well have survived. That this 
has been so seldom perceived in Conrad criticism is due to a reluctance to 
admit to so deeply anti-social a conclusion. The point is reinforced by the 
example of Razumov, in Under Western Eyes, whose isolation is shattered 
by Victor Haldin. All Razumov, like Heyst, had wanted was to be left alone. 
The consequence of his fatal weakness in sympathising with Haldin is suffering 
and death. 
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It is too often overlooked when dealing with the isolated condition of 
Conrad's characters that none of any importance complains of his condition; 
indeed, some of the noblest , like Lord Jim, who "had no dealings but with 
himself," are loftily above such a concern. Conrad accepts the walls that 
separate people as natural, and at times of benefit. In particular, it is noticeable 
that 'pairs' of characters never break through to one another. Jim remains 
"insuutable at heart" even to Marlow. Impenetrable barriers separate Alan 
Harvey and his wife in "The Return," and other couples are similarly alienated 
from each other: Yanko Goorall and Amy Foster, the Goulds, Heyst and Lena, 
the Verlocs, and Captain Anthony and Flora. But such isolation, however 
tragic, is inevitable. It is this theme of 'unconnectedness' that is at the centre 
of E.M. Forster's novels, but with Forster isolation is far from inevitable, 
provided there is a willingness to commune between people with "developed 
hearts." No such communion, or even communication, is allowed for by 
Conrad. When it appears to exist, as in Nostromo between Emilia and Charles 
Gould, it is proved to be merely an illusion, a self-deception. 
Adam Gillon claims further that "Conrad's lonely heroes are an affirmation 
of human solidarity, .. man's isolation proves that no person with a conscience 
can live by himself."13 What Gillon does not notice is that having a conscience 
- in the sense that Heyst and Razumov exercised theirs so fatally - is not a 
necessary requirement of the Conrad hero. When Jim allows Gentleman 
Brown to escape he has no thought of what may follow that decision, if not 
in Patusan then in the world outside Patusan. There is no evidence to support 
the view of Conrad's heroes as affirmations of human solidarity, for it is plain 
that the isolated, the men of conscience, and the men of no conscience, all 
are made to perish-without reward. Although Conrad claimed to hope in his 
work to" ... awaken that feeling of unavoidable solidarity,"14 in practice he 
proclaimed the fact of isolation as inevitable. His wish was at odds with his 
outlook. And even the wish may be doubted in view of Conrad's picture of 
his fellow man: 
L'homme est un animal mechant. Sa mechancete doit etre 
organisee. Le crime est une condition necessaire de !'existence 
organisee. La societe est essentiellement criminelle, - ou elle 
n'existerait pas. C'est l'egoisme qui sauve tout, - absolument 
tout,- tout ce que nous abhorrons, tout ce que nous aimons.15 
By its very nature, Conrad's outlook required him to be suspicious of all 
human progress, and especially of political or social progress. Living at a 
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time when most writers, and many of his friends, believed ardently in one 
political creed or another, Conrad adopted an attitude of aloofness. That the 
reasons for this attitude were moral rather than artistic is obvious from his 
letters to Cunninghame Graham and Wells. To Wells the social reformer 
Conrad wrote, "You don't care for humanity but think they are to be improved. 
I love humanity but know they are not."16 His pessimism prevented him from 
believing in social or political improvement. To those critics who nevertheless 
insist on reading into Conrad's works a political message, a suitable caution 
is provided by Joseph Retinger, a fellow Pole living in England, who wrote: 
When it came to the principles of governing mankind he was not 
a very moral person, I am afraid, and with Montesquieu he 
shrugged his shoulders at the thought of a Chinese Mandarin 
killed thousands of miles away ... he had no faith in politics as 
a factor which might bring any substantial reward to suffering 
humanity, because, he reasoned, politics cannot change human 
nature, which alone is the origin of good and evil.17 
If we exclude the non-fictional pieces Conrad was pressed into writing, 
such as "Autocracy and War," the prevalent note in the "political" works, 
Under Western Eyes, and The Secret Agent, and the short stories "Heart of 
Darkness" and "An Outpost of Progress," is one of unfailing scepticism: 
human, social and political perfectability are treated ironically as illusions: 
ridiculous at best and dangerous, as in The Secret Agent, at worst. 
As an extension of such scepticism, Conrad also clearly questioned man's 
passionate attachment to life itself. Eighteen of his characters, most of them 
major, commit suicide: either out out of despair when faced by the true nature 
of reality, or in offering themselves as a sacrifice to an ethical ideal, or simply 
by choosing to stop living. Conrad himself, as we now know, attempted 
suicide in Marseilles in 1878, and he is rivalled only by Ibsen in the number 
of suicides in his works. Never is there any hint of condemnation of suicides 
in Conrad; rather, one may easily see in his attitudes towards it a positive 
attraction, and there is in this none of the careless disdain for life that one 
finds in Sartre and Camus. The suicide of Axel Heyst is born of a repugnance 
for life, and a desire to end the illusions of living. 
Few Conrad scholars have failed to notice the strangeness of his attitudes 
towards nature and physical love. In treating of the latter, most have analysed 
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Conrad's attitude as springing from a reticence compounded of prudishness 
anq a distaste for the vulgar. Thomas Moser, however, believes that to Conrad 
love was the 'uncongenial subject,' and the bete noire of his artistic struggle. 
Moser notices that Conrad, particularly in the early works, sets his love scenes 
in natural backgrounds that exude either death and decay or sinister growth. 
Moser does not relate the association of passion and repellent nature to 
Conrad's outlook on life"' rather, he sees the symptoms of a troubled psyche, 
and claims that "the inappropriate imagery used in connection with lovers 
suggests that their creator is so seriously confused that he cannot carry out 
his artistic intentions."18 
One doubts that Conrad would have agreed that his imagery was 
"inappropriate." On the contrary, it was highly appropriate to his view of 
reality as essentially evil, and love as an illusory condition leading in its sexual 
aspect trl a multiplication of earthly materia. This attitude is also not confined 
to the e, .rly works, or to those set in the tropics: in The Secret Agent the 
natural background is uniformly sinister and squalid, and in "The Sisters" 
manuscript, when Conrad describes in detail Stephen's retreat in Passy he 
spe1ks of the trees in the garden growing "as if in a dungeon ... fragile and 
me; 1ced by fertile grass which sprang up vigorous and conquering over the 
desolate remnant of beauty."19 
Given that "impassable walls" exist between people, and that love is an 
illusion, and that this illusion is in fact enfeebling, it follows that sensual 
passion will be viewed as corrupting, and relegated to the order of things to 
be avoided. Both nature and love are treated as acceptable by Conrad only 
when they are passive. Activity signifies the presence of a malevolent force. 
But if Conrad's outlook was made up of the above attitudes, his was 
nevertheless not a counsel of despair. Some few men, the Marlows and Steins 
of this world, achieve a level of perception that finally allows them to enjoy 
their passage on earth: they manage to come to terms with "a universe whose 
amazing spectacle is a moral end in itself."20 
Such men stand in Conrad's books at the top of an ethical hierarchy. 
Baines writes of this fact with some degree of bafflement, "It is a strange 
theory that destiny should be reserved only for the elect ... but that seems 
to be Conrad's contention in Lord Jim."21 The elect can, as in Lord Jim, serve 
as instruction to other men of 'fine conscience.' "Perception and power," 
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says the Athenian stranger in The Laws of Plato, "are not these two opposed 
in respect to ease and difficulty?" What is remarkable about the elect in 
Conrad's work is that their achievement is always a heightened perception, 
whereas other more worldly men seek only power. Perception of the true 
nature of reality , and oneself, leads Conrad's elect to a faith in the necessity 
of a few simple truths: man must be faithful above all to himself, and to the 
ideal standard that he sets up for himself. If that standard requires him also 
to be faithful to one or more others, then it is also part of his moral obligation 
to be so. The elect are armed with an instinctive sense of honour, and with 
the practical ability to devote themselves to particular tasks. In "Heart of 
Darkness,'' what prevents Marlow from succumbing to the evil projected by 
the dying Kurtz is his determined hard work in repairing and piloting the 
steamer. Thus the practical code of behaviour advocated by Conrad combines 
some of the elements of medieval chivalry with others of a Calvinist hue. 
Both the code itself, and the system of its transmission from gnostic elect to 
auditor, derive mainly from Conrad's uncle Tadeusz Bobrowski. In 
Bobrowski's letters, and especially in those addressed to "My Dear 
Pessimist," one finds a distillation of the philosophy of Stein in Lord Jim, 
culminating in the Bobrowski-Stein motto "Usque ad finem." 
The 'answer' that Conrad provides implies always the question, "Why 
should men behave like this?" And that question is answerable only in terms 
of Conrad's own, highly individual perception of the visible world. Unless we 
are to hold that Conrad's vocabulary was very limited, we must concede that 
his insistence on images of light and darkness was intentional, and that his 
choice of imagery expressed (whether consciously or unconsciously) his view 
of the world. Many other writers have seemed also to view the world in light 
and dark terms, and many have employed such a symbolism in their works. 
But few have done this so obsessively, or at the apparent expense of style, 
or so consistently as Conra9 does. His association of light and white images 
with Good, and dark and black images with Evil, amounts to a step well 
beyond the device of symbolic language: it indicates a possible conviction 
that they are literally the same - that light~ Good, and darkness~ Evil, rather 
than their being only representational. 
It might be maintained that Conrad, as a result of his long years at sea 
and in the tropics, was morbidly sensitve to effects of gradations of light (as 
apparently the painter Daumier was), but this would scarcely account for the 
obvious ethical significance of light and dark imagery in his works. In "Heart 
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of Darkness," when Kurtz is brought aboard the steamer, Marlow says, "His 
was an impenetrable darkness ... one evening coming in with a candle I 
was startled to hear him say a little tremulously, 'I am lying here in the dark 
waiting ffor death.' The light was within a foot of his eyes."22 This is followed 
several paragraphs later, after the announcement of "Mistah Kurtz- he dead," 
with the puzzling summation of Marlow's feeling: he says, a propos of nothing 
and immediately after a remarkon his loss of appetite, "There was a lamp in 
there- light, don't you know- and outside it was so beastly, beastly dark."23 
We can make nothing of such passages as these, and they are many, if we 
maintain a sophisticated literary distance from what Conrad seems to be 
saying, if we search pedantically for what the symbolic representations of 
light and darkness "stand for." In short, they may not symbolise, but be Good 
and Evil, and in such a Manichaen reading of the text the difficulty vanishes. 
To return in this brief overview of Conrad's outlook to the nature of his 
absolute and cosmic pessimism, we may summarise his attitudes as follows: 
Conrad seems to have viewed the world as composed of two elements: 
(1) Reality, or evil, as expressed in materiality, nature, and human fallibility; 
(2) Illusion - the 'dream' of life, as manifested in (a) the surface illusions 
of happiness, pleasure, success, and (b) the enfeebling illusions of love, 
sympathy, intellectualisation, and imagination. 
Perched on the harms of his fate, man's life is a continual struggle against 
catastrophic annihilation that may come from within (Illusion) or without 
(Reality). 
The end of life for men of 'fine conscience' is an ascetic detachment from 
it, and an attitude towards it of 'cold unconcern.' For such men, the only 
lasting satisfaction is that of having enjoyed the spectacle of existence while 
defending oneself: the simple enjoyment of the exhilaration of the chase that 
is life. The ideal state of perception or true gnosis is never fully attainable, 
but remains fixed as a goal in the minds of the elect and the potentially elect; 
the path towards it is singleminded attention to honour, fidelity and the practice 
of 'simple virtue.' 
At the lowest level of t~is ethical hierarchy is the mass of humanity, which 
has neither the ambition nor the natural equipment for spiritual quest. But 
Conrad distinguishes three categories of ordinary (non-elect) mankind: 
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1. The instinctively good, who are unreflecting men of simple virtue (e.g., 
Singleton, MacWhirr, and Captain Whalley), and whom Conrad renders in 
imagery that is uniformly light or white; 
2. The bulk of mankind which goes its way unheedingly, in connection with 
whom there is a neutral rendering, a mixture of light and dark; 
3. The instinctively evil, who are virtually agents for the force of darkness, 
and who are always rendered in dark or. black imagery (e.g., Heemskirk, 
Gentleman Brown, Kurtz), both in its physical and psychological aspects. 
Finally, isolation is a natural condition of existence, both in its physical 
and psychological aspects. 
Thus Conrad's pessimism, founded on the doctrine that reality is 
essentially evil, is far more thorough-going than the pessimism of Hardy or 
de Maupassant. The course of action he seems to advocate, while having 
much in common with the Cynical-Stoic tradition, differs from that advocated 
by Voltaire or Ibsen in its defensive character, and in its mocking of any 
possibility of transcending the difficulties of life. His dualism is pagan and 
absolute, thus separating him from the Christian Dualist writers, such as 
Dostoevsky, Melville and Hawthorne. 
This is, it must be said, a different Joseph Conrad from the writer we have 
long been familiar with. In this view, it is no longer tenable to dismiss the 
descriptions of nature as 'purple patches,' or to sidestep the issue of his 
'adjectival insistence' as his narrative becomes ever more densely 
philosophical. The Conrad that emerges when we recognise the 
uncompromising, and unique, form of his pessimism may prove to be less 
congenial than the Conrad we thought we knew. There are indeed elements 
in his outlook which are profoundly antisocial and even anti-life, but we should 
recognise that they spring fran venerable sources. They have none of that 
taint that attaches to the works of, say, Celina and Genet, whose anti-humanity 
was the expression of active rebellion against the very society that produced 
them. At the very least, we may be able at last to use "that portentous term, 
philosophy"24 of Conrad, as it always deserved to be used, in our continuing 
attempt to unravel the meaning of his works. 
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